

Part 2, JANUARY 1944: ETO – European Theater LMN

(Author's Procedural Note). xyza

Summaries Do Not Good Make Good Chronologies. January to May 1944 began with Eisenhower arriving as Supreme Commander leading to a string of events for a 5 June D-Day. The historians lump January to May 1944 decisions on a topic, not chronological, basis. This causes a bi-monthly analysis to flit topic to topic creating confusion. **Summarizing at the end of the Period Works Best in the Five Months Before D-Day.** This section of the Combined History from January into May 1944 presents issues at the end as final decisions were made, rather than track 15 issues month-by-month.

A. Report Supreme Commander on Operations in Europe¹ (Jan 1-15, 1944) xyza

1. **Development of Plan OVERLORD.** I did not know I would be the Supreme Commander until December 1943. I felt initial forces were insufficient and on too narrow of a front. I wanted a unified staff, so I moved from London to Bushy Park, my first staff meeting was 21 January. I knew 1) there were far greater defenses in France, 2) my Sicily experience was no precedent, 3) a three-division OVERLORD was too small (five were needed). 3 4 5 6 4) the beach area needed to be wider, and 5) the capture of the Cotentin and Cherbourg had to be speedily done. We increased the COSSAC area east to Ouistreham and west to the Cotentin Peninsula.

(Comment: In this next paragraph Eisenhower describes his strategic vision). Early in May 1944 planners saw the drive into Germany on the left (north) flank with another to Metz (north and south of Paris) to join Gen Devers' to cut off (not capture) Southwest France. Then penetrate the Siegfried Line north clearing German forces west of the Rhine in the Cologne-Bonn area, with "a power crossing of the Rhine north of the Ruhr"; and at Frankfurt to join near Kassel encircle the Ruhr. Further German destruction would be easy. It was "practically identical with that ... (of) the campaign." Montgomery had operational control of land forces until 7 the U.S. had an Army Group equal to British 21 Army Group -- likely when Third Army was activated.

By D-day the Allies had 37 divisions: 23 infantry, 10 armored, and 4 airborne. In May I had 90 divisions: 61 American (68%), 13 British (14%), 5 Canadian (5%), 10 French (11%) and 1 Polish (1%). *(Comment: Much of U.S. frustration against Marshall Montgomery and, to a lesser extent Churchill, is traced to these whereby the U.S. raised and supplied both their own and the French forces or 80% of and combat forces!)* The divisions, with attached anti-aircraft, anti-tank, and tank units habitually averaged about 17,000 men, twice that of Russian divisions. Plus, three incomplete French divisions and lesser Czech, Belgian, and Dutch forces on the Continent and FFI (French Forces of the Interior). The FFI equaled 15 divisions.

The Allied Naval Expeditionary Force under Adm Ramsay. My naval forces in North African and Sicilian Campaigns were small to this "great amphibious assault". The berthing, loading, and moving entailed

¹ Condensed and paraphrased without quotations noted.

5,000 ships and 4,000 "ship-to-shore" craft. All was according to plan in tribute to the effort, and foresight of the thousands engaged. Naval forces had to be increased to 6 battleships, 2 monitors, 22 cruisers, and 93 destroyers. A daytime invasion using Pacific lessons with shifting a vast fleet in narrow waters with five different H-hours.

Naval forces would sweep all channels and shuttle supplies and reinforcements. The Navy had five artificial anchorages (GOOSEBERRIES) with two to be major artificial harbors (MULBERRIES) for most our stores. For oil, the Navy had tanker discharge points with pipelines or "PLUTO". By 25 April huge berthing problems were solved using every available berth up to Belfast. The Germans would observe this, so the hope was to confuse the Germans on time and location.

Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory had British Second Tactical Air Force and U.S. Ninth Air Force, and strategic Air Forces had tactical chores. **89** Plans expanded to three months to cripple French and Belgian railways. Tactical Air hit rail targets, bridges, airfields, coastal batteries and radar with 2,434 fighters and fighter-bombers plus 700 light and medium bombers. Rail center and bridge attacks were to deny Germans from concentrating and supply.

Railroad center attacks began at D-60 over wide areas for deception narrowed down before D-day. Only 1/3rd of bombs hit military and road targets in the invasion area intending to cutoff the invasion area from rail and road traffic. Airfield attacks within 130-miles drove German fighters to distant bases and they protected Channel movements, destroyed radar, hindered battery and beach defenses, and protected the fleets. They kept an air

curtain of 10 fighter squadrons over beaches with 6 for beach cover and 5 over the Channel at 60 miles, 3 at 80 miles from England and 32 squadrons on rapidly response. D-day assault fighter effort is in the adjacent table. **10** Photo recon units worked a year to provide detailed, accurate data. Remarkable were beach top sorties for photos of beach defenses.

| Type | Squadrons |
|-----------------------------------|-----------|
| Beach Cover | 54 |
| Shipping Cover | 15 |
| Direct Air Support | 36 |
| Offensive Fighter & Bomber Escort | 33 |

2. Logistical Problems. Casablanca had considered a South France invasion and I felt it an important step. We hoped two ANVIL divisions, the underestimated the craft per division needs leaving out "attachments" (armor, engineers, SOS, etc.) and service forces. CCS postponed ANVIL for lack of landing craft on 24 March to be four weeks after OVERLORD **11** using Mediterranean landing craft.

The U.S. U.K. build-up continued under Gen JCH Lee per plan BOLERO, April 1942 and later increased in 1943 and 1944 for OVERLORD. On D-day, the Communications Zone had 31,500 officers and 350,000 enlisted. By July 1943 750,000 tons per month came through English ports with an invasion stockpile of 2.5 million tons and 1,562,000 U.S. on June 1. Plus, large quantities came from British resources. These had to cross beaches for two months while the Cherbourg port developed. Plans had ports built in Brittany, **the major effort in that area to be an artificial port at Quiberon Bay** with existing ports of Brest, Lorient, St-Nazaire, and Nantes (*emphasis added*). Two artificial harbors (MULBERRY "A" and "B") plus Brittany ports were U.S. as Channel ports, Ostend and Antwerp were for British armies. It did not occur, but U.S. and U.K. systems supported the armies in a remarkable tribute to the flexibility of their organizations.

German strategy to preclude this proved the worth. Hitler ordered European ports to fight to the last man and bullet. They did not know about the artificial harbors, which made it impossible to dislodge us. A captured document read: "I cannot understand these Americans. Each night we know that we have cut them to pieces ... almost decimated entire battalions. But ... we are suddenly faced with fresh battalions ... replacements of men, machines, food, tools, and weapons ... If I did not see it ... I would say it is impossible to give this kind of support to front-line troops ... " **12**

3. German Miscalculations. Unable to hide an invasion was imminent, the where, when, and what strength were unknown. The Germans did not ferret out the site, but the Pas-de-Calais was obvious with German *Fifteenth Army* defending. It could move. We assumed the Germans would predict Normandy, but we put the forces in East England, not southeast, so the German would conclude the main assault would be further to the northeast. Bomb plans focused near the Pas-de-Calais hoping our effort to bomb V-1 sites would be misinterpreted. Artificial harbors were moored with the same idea. Thus, *Fifteenth Army* remained in the Pas-de-Calais until 25 July, which then was a fruitless attempt.

Public measures protected secrecy. Thus, on 9 February travel to Ireland (a neutral) was suspended **13**. On 1 April coast areas were closed to nonresidents and diplomatic privileges were cut in April. U.S. mail, calls and packages were held.

4. Preparatory Operations. Preparatory operations for Air Forces and the Navy were underway. CCS had final authority over strategic bombing, but "I was nevertheless dissatisfied with the arrangement, feeling that ..., all the forces to be employed with the Theater ... should be responsible to me ... (and) for concentrated bombing of the rail network ... particularly France ... I felt strongly about both these matters." The CCS gave me control of the Strategic Air Forces on 14 April on call for direct support - a role for which they had not been used until Salerno proved their worth. Bomber Command, USAF Strategic Air **14** and Leigh-Mallory's tactical planes reported to me through Air Chief Marshal Tedder.

The existing Combined Bomber Offensive ("CBO") had six systems: submarines, aircraft, ball bearings, oil, rubber, and communications. But OVERLORD mandated air supremacy over England and the beachhead, so air forces first targeted the *Luftwaffe*, which we knew was key to smashing our invasion and plans to add 3,000 combat planes/month up to a first line of 10,000 planes. Air fighting in May 1943 began the process, but the Germans had the same number of planes December 1943 as a year before. January 1944 began the effort that cut most GAF production. This and a fuel shortage gave us air superiority where the Germans refused combat. Without it our assault would have been most hazardous.

By D-day the Strategic and Tactical Air had damaged German logistics with shortages locomotives and cars, coal, repair facilities, and 74 impassable bridges and tunnels to Normandy. "The communications chaos ... had fatal effects upon the enemy ... after our landings." I took responsibility for French civilian casualties and **15** damaging their economy. While French Gen Koenig sought some reconsideration, he said French lives would be lost: "It is war." "French people, far from being alienated, accepted the hardships and suffering with a realism ..." With air supremacy, Allied bombers focused on enemy oil reserves in April for a 20% production drop. By December it dropped 70% eliminating bomber force and U-boat threats and denied transport to tens of thousands of enemy captured. By the Ardennes (December) German units needed captured U.S. fuel to continue. Oil was Germany's first priority. Strategic Air supported major tactical efforts, including the Ardennes battle.

Naval forces trained sailors and fought German E-boats. Exercise TIGER for Force "U" was attacked with deaths from sinking two LST's. Otherwise, exercises and Slapton Sands created invaluable assault doctrines and training. **16** These pre-invasion exercises should have engendered a strong German response; but they did not do so.

5. Enemy Capabilities. We expected violent German fighter and E-boat responses mandating substantial air coverage. *Kriegsmarine* had: 5 destroyers, 9 to 11 torpedo boats, 50 to 60 E-boats, 50 to 60 R-boats, 25 to 30 "M" class sweepers, 60 miscellaneous craft and 130 U-boats. Navy mines and patrols kept U-boats from the invasion area.

By 3 June the Germans had 60 land divisions of 10 panzer and 50 infantry divisions with 42 on the coast. Normandy had 10 divisions great *Fifteenth Army* strength north in the Pas-de-Calais. **17** Bombing bridges isolated the battle area and diversionary plans kept strategic reserves away from Normandy. German "V" weapons caused concern for shipping, but the problem did not arise. I visited many of the invasion encampments. morale was excellent. Confidence shown at the final briefing at St. Paul's School, 21 Army Group HQ, London, on 15 May. Next came the "supreme decisions" **18**

B. CHAPTER 5 and 6: Supreme Command: Pogue; Planning before Eisenhower by SHAEF Jan 1-15 xyza

1. Russia, Russia, Russia. Within six weeks of Dunkirk, July 1940, Churchill ordered the design of craft to land tanks for armored raids and proposed to raid and blow-up Channel ports. Gen John Dill ordered was ordered to return for this in September 1941 and as by January 1942 British Chiefs wistfully plan for a coup against Hitler in January 1942 under the rubric of: "if a sudden change in the situation should appear to warrant such a course." **98** Since land operations in Europe were impossible, Britain's greatest contribution was trying to divert German forces from Russia. After Pearl Harbor U.S. Army Forces in the British Isles (USAFBI) opened 8 January 1942 under Gen. Chaney. Gen Eaker and his embryo bomber command staff arrived. Eisenhower's 28 February 1942 memo argued the need to keep the Soviets fighting with operations only intended to draw off German forces in May 1942. On 16 March the British planned to invade Le Havre, **99** but only if there were a "severe deterioration" of Germany. Marshall ordered plans for an early 1943 invasion, but in April the CCS found this meant "the loss of equipment and most of their troops, but raiding was the only option. Hopkins and Marshall arrived in April 1942 with "the first definite plan for a large-scale cross-Channel operation in case of "a serious weakening of Russia or the probable collapse of Germany"". BOLERO planned the buildup, SLEDGEHAMMER the emergency invasion and ROUNDUP a full 1943 invasion. Given such "impossibilities", the British pushed Africa. Marshall concluded "... if the Allies did not divert enemy forces from the Russian front in 1942 a full-scale attack on northwest Europe might be ineffective in 1943" ... too late! **100** Thus, was the North Africa invasion a great gamble.

Yet, North Africa's TORCH seriously hurt the BOLERO build-up in the U.K., made a 1943 ROUNDUP impracticable and "virtually abandoned" the CBO (Combined Bomber Offensive). The Mediterranean actions extended to Sicily and Italy in 1943, **101** while a cross-Channel attack was only "on an academic level". Assault training centers invented techniques, bombing raids increased, the U.K. began "to organize ... Resistance forces" and the August 1942 Dieppe incurred heavy casualties. North

Africa became "a training and testing ground, a college on ... war ... a dress rehearsal for the far larger ... operations... that are still to come." The common denominator in all of these events was the survival of the Soviet Union. There was no success if the Soviets were defeated.

2. Allied Hopes for 1943 and the COSSAC Faux Plans. Pogue provides a barometer of Allied fears and hopes in 1943. At Casablanca in January the British argued the Allies could not leave forces unemployed in Africa to obtain more Mediterranean operations **102** while preparations for a cross-Channel attack began with a planning staff (COSSAC) and bomber offensive on 10 June 1943. COSSAC plans were approved by the CCS in Quebec in August 1943. However, Churchill claimed all rested upon German ground or air strength not exceeding defined levels. **103** The CBO sought to organize and prioritize the bombing plan with definite target priorities, which were useful, but not enforceable.


The early fall of 1943 saw ... (possibilities of a) German collapse or withdrawal from the occupied countries ... (as of) early September ... The fall of Mussolini ... rapidly conquest of Sicily ... and Italy's unconditional surrender ... (indicated) the Axis was disintegrating ... On the Eastern Front ... as the Russian attack ... spread ... (it) threw the Germans back toward the Dnieper ... On 9 September ... the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee of the War Cabinet ... concluded "... Germany is ... in a worse condition today than ... **104** in 1918." "... we may see the defection of the rest of Germany's European Allies ... (as) German people and military leaders ... (find) war is more to be feared than ... defeat. With ... military leaders convinced of the futility ... there might be ... some sudden change of regime ... (One) British officer described (the hope) as "our annual collapse of Germany prediction" (But with) winter ... the Allies became less hopeful (At) year's end, the enemy's fighter force ... was actually increasing ... Air Chief Marshal Portal's December 1943 (report said) POINTBLANK was three months behind schedule ...

A few COSSAC plans for (COCKADE) feigned attacks were executed, **105** including the Brest peninsula (WADHAM), Norway (TINDALL), and Pas-de-Calais (STARKEY). Results were inconclusive. COSSAC had three RANKIN plans (A, B, and C) for a sudden change in Germany via (A) substantial weakening permitting an assault; (B) withdrawal from occupied countries, and (C) unconditional surrender. They were "contingency" plans in the extreme! It was not a plan, but it did contain: "... much valuable information in ... (on) port capacities, naval requirements, availability of ships and landing craft, availability of ground forces, attainment of the necessary air superiority ... planning data for landing craft and shipping, rate of build-up, resistance groups, enemy naval and defense ... beaches, meteorological ... topography ... "

The COSSAC "plan" was reference book of information on weather, tides, geography, etc. Beyond stating the general ideas (described as "useless") ... but COSSAC ... contributed mightily ... to the "groundwork ..." Yet, there were no invasion plans! **106**

Here is the mystery. No one claims Morgan's plans were complete, some say they were useless. The "official" histories laud his work, but Montgomery's planners ignored them. Six months after Morgan's plans were praised at Quebec, they were trashed by Montgomery and then by Eisenhower. The facts fail to illuminate any success beyond mediocrity. On about 3 January, Montgomery, de Guingand and Smith sought: 1) a greater first assault; 2) quicker build-up; 3) more airborne; and 4) larger beachheads. "All ... (knew) the Allies ... faced a ... far superior ... (enemy and for) victory, the Allies would have to limit ... **107** enemy reinforcements ... capture ports rapidly, and prepare artificial harbors ... But not until the

7. As regards circumstances that we can control only indirectly, it is, in time my opinion, necessary to stipulate that the state of affair existing at the time, both on land, in France and in the air above it, shall be such as to render the assault as little hazardous as may be so far as it is humanly possible to calculate. The essential discrepancy in value between the enemy's troops, highly organized, armed and battle-trained, who await us in their much-vaunted impregnable defences and out troops, who must launch their assault at the end of a cross-Channel voyage with all its attendant risks, must be reduced by the narrowest possible margin. Though much can be done to this end by the means available and likely to become available to us in the United Kingdom to influence



these factors, we are largely dependent upon events that will take place on other war fronts, principally on the Russian front, between now and the date of the assault.

8. I therefore suggest to the Chiefs of Staff that it is necessary if my plan be approved, to adopt the outlook that Operation OVERLORD is even now in progress, and to take all possible step to see that all agencies that can be brought to bear are, from now on, coordinated in their action as herein below described, so as to bring about the state of affairs that we would have exist on the chosen day of assault.

9. Finally, I venture to draw attention to the danger of making direct comparisons between operation "Husky" and operation "Overlord". No doubt the experience now being gained in the Mediterranean will prove invaluable when the detailed planning stage for "Overlord" is reached but viewed as a whole the two operation could hardly be more dissimilar in "Husky". The bases of an extended continental coastline were used for a converging assault against an island, whereas in "Overlord" it is necessary to launch an assault from an island against an extended continental mainland coastline. Furthermore, while in the Mediterranean the tidal range is negligible and the weather reasonably reliable, in the English Channel the tidal range is considerable and the weather capricious.


10. Attached hereto are papers setting forth the planed that I recommend for adoption.

F.E. MORGAN, Lt. Gen. Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander (Designate)

H.Q., COSSAC, Norfolk House, St. James Square, S.W.1.

This was the report Morgan gave to the Quebec Conference. It was incomplete until January 1944. It had but three maps. COSSAC **Map 1** showed the beaches off the south coast of England. COSSAC **Map 2** a colored map, showed soil types for building airfields. COSSAC **Map 3** was a rough estimate of the Allied situation on D + 8 days. While “official” histories laud Gen Morgan’s work, when Montgomery arrived in early January it was ignored. At most we are told Montgomery’s planners began from “scratch”. Pre-D-Day plans mentioned elsewhere may refer to a “shockingly” incomplete COSSAC plans that left barely three months to organize the most important invasion of modern history.

(Comment: If true, the predominance of Montgomery in pre-D-Day planning makes more sense. That he took upon himself so much credit for D-Day planning may be close to the truth; not so much an arrogant, irritating personality)



C. January 1-15, 1944: Davis Combined Bombing Offensive (Air Univ 2006) xyza

1. Air Battles Diary 1 to 15 January. 259

1 Jan: U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe (USSAFE) was established in London by Lt Gen Spaatz to control both the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces. (On 4 February 1944, its abbreviation was USSTAF).

3 Jan: Fifteenth (Italy) —Maj Gen Nathan F. Twining takes command.

4 Jan: Eighth AF—supplies to resistance forces in Western Europe via Carpetbagger.

6 Jan: Eighth AF —Gen Doolittle in command; Gen Eaker commands the Mediterranean MAAF.

7 Jan: Eighth AF —a B-24 interned in Switzerland.

8 Jan: Fifteenth AF—has 8 heavy bomber groups.

11 Jan: Eighth AF —First use of H2S on B-24.

2. January Battles concerning OVERLORD Strategic Bombing and Its Targets. 213 The five months from January through May 1944, saw strategic air warfare swing to the Allies’ favor. Bomber Command losses caused a halt to seek more night accuracy leaving a huge hole in OVERLORD preparations. U.S. planes prevailed with “aggressive use of long-range fighters”, bomb routes and a sustained *Luftwaffe* tussle that: “broke the Germans’ back.” The first five months “operations and new battle tactics ... (had) pivotal influence” on target selection—the key as Eisenhower’s command became “less contentious”. The second theme is the “sustained controversy” upon “command and control and target selection”. 213 It revolved upon commands of Carl Spaatz and the RAF air commands (Defense of Great Britain, Coastal, and Bomber) would play in 217 the invasion.³ Eisenhower “achieved a barely satisfactory solution” over three months. Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory controlled all Allied tactical air (British 2nd Tactical and US Ninth AAF) but asserted control over all planes “assisting the

³ The text is missing pages 214-216.

invasion” – which was all planes. Spaatz and Harris violently objected with reason. Leigh-Mallory became an unsound choice as D-Day approached. Author Davis concurs his egoism, “habitually haughty manner” and “assertive temperament” were too much. “... tactless ... almost pompous ... without any finesse ...”; **218** and obdurate refusal to compromise – all “grave defects as he “not mesh with his U.S. deputies” (U.S. Gen’s Vandenberg, Frederick Smith or Brereton, or RAF’s Marshal Coningham and he disagreed with Tedder -- “a man more distinguished in his right as an air leader”).

Tedder had Coningham, whom Montgomery and Leigh-Mallory disliked. Tedder put Air Vice-Marshal Broadhurst over large RAF No. 83 (Fighter) Group who was Leigh-Mallory’s last choice. Both neither men “had much use for Leigh-Mallory” and the two bomber generals were suspicious of Leigh-Mallory. Spaatz and other U.S. aviators returned his hostility in kind. When Gen Haywood Hansell left for the Pacific, his replacements **219** did not this British “haughtiness”. Second, British 2nd TAF had 150 RAF vs only 80 AAF officers. It was legitimate since 2nd TAF also had British home defense planes. Spaatz could not tolerate British forces in planning his OVERLORD air campaign as he was set upon destroying the *Luftwaffe* fighters by D-Day so his fighters could focus on ground support. Leigh-Mallory disagreed on air superiority by 6 June. Since the Germans avoided combat, waiting was for Spaatz. **220**

3. SHAEFE Control. Eisenhower had a “Gordian knot” which mandated in January that he command all RAF forces and all AAF strategic bombers in addition to Leigh-Mallory’s British and U.S. fighters. Gen Arnold promised his strategic air (Eighth and Fifteenth) would be under Ike which Gen Spaatz modified to on D+60 days. The disputes that came were over “where” and “when”, not “if”, but it was confused in in late January and lasted to May 1944.⁴ **221 228** Spaatz, Harris and Churchill, had heated disputes with Leigh-Mallory’s AEF (Allied Expeditionary Air Force), Overlord planners and the strategic air forces that Eisenhower and Tedder refereed, with some impartiality.⁵ For his part, Spaatz accepted his would be under Eisenhower to argue timing and amounts, but refused more than 60 days out. He validly sought to not lose strategic gains his Eighth AF achieved. As to Harris, his mass destruction vs “pinpoint accuracy” bombing (a skeptical phrase) required constant attacks to find German night fighters improving so his 3-month losses to German fighters rose from 348 to 796 bombers over 3-months! Then, his bombers wiped out French rail yards proving their worth here, but against Bomber Harris’ wishes. **229**

4. Transportation Plan. Meantime, zoologist Solly Zuckerman the Italian tactical bombing efforts had a January 1944 “Europe Transportation (Bombing) Plan”, based upon his Italy efforts. Working with Leigh-Mallory, he had new, improved Plans that assumed air superiority for these targets: 1) airfields; 2) coastal defenses; and 3) German communications – the latter the major effort as rails were most critical for enemy stores and armor – another “Achilles Tendon”. **230** Rail repairs were quick, but not as good. Bombing rail yards scattered supplies, disabled assembling and disassembling trains, and spare parts and maintenance. Parts became an immediate problem, but when railyard “humps” (man-made hills for gravity to move cars into new “trains”) were wrecked, yards stopped. His plan dovetailed with pre-D-Day bomb timetables **231** for a “rail maintenance and repair desert ... to the German border.”

⁴ The summary skips 7 pages.

⁵ *Skipping ahead in the text 7 pages.*

Second, 24 days before D-Day all *Luftwaffe* bases within 130 miles of the beaches would be wrecked putting German fighters the same distance away from battles. Bombing would start 1 March with a long effort (+ 90 days). Having sold Eisenhower and Teddar, he had the “juice” to force cooperation. Teddar was both “competent” and not tied to a particular air force. **232** Zuckerman and Leigh-Mallory found all agreed on defeating coast defenses, but much less so when it came to the *Luftwaffe* and railroads. Then Eighth AAF only wanted rail targets in Germany, but Zuckerman’s list was in France. German fighters would defend German, but not French, rail yards. AAF’s Strategic Air Col Hughes said Eighth only had enough planes for German, not French, targets. Arguments against bombing were many. **233**

5. Bomber Command. **260** The January Battle of Berlin and major cities saw 9 air attacks with 4,350 heavy bomber sorties: Berlin – 6 attacks (11,865 bomb tons); Magdeburg – 1 attack (2,500 tons); Hannover 1 attack (2,500 tons); and Stettin 1 attack (1,258 tons). Berlin claimed 202 planes; the others had 111 missing. It was an awful 7% loss rate for “almost no gain in the number of crews available” and new men “lacked seasoning.” This “drain decreased performance; increased casualties and accidents.” Night fighters claimed most of the 313 lost bombers.

German ground controllers guided fighters to the bomber stream with a “running commentary” negating **261 262** “Window” anti-radar chaff. Controllers nearly perfected the task of putting *Luftwaffe* fighters into the RAF “bomber stream” despite RAF 1) jamming, 2) “tinsel” (or chaff) to disrupt their radios and 3) fake instructions to German fighters. Bomber Command countered by hiding the intended target via evasive routing. “Thus, a feint by Mosquitoes toward Berlin sent *Luftwaffe* after bombers that were not there.” In January 1944, the speedy Mosquitoes struck bearings and steel facilities, and cities. Their high speed and altitudes, alone or in small packets, meant the unarmed planes remained nearly invulnerable losing just one-half of one percent (0.5%) of their sorties.

6. Changed U.S. Air Commands. On 1 January 1944 U.S. strategic air saw a new era in command and personnel. Lt Gen Carl A. Spaatz, former North African Air Forces commander, took over US Eighth Air Force to change its name to USSTAF (which still meant “U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe!”) Then Lt Gen James H. Doolittle left command of US Fifteenth Air Force in the MTO to command the Eighth (former VIII Bomber Command). Maj Gen Nathan F. Twining took command of the US Fifteenth Air Force in Italy. Spaatz controlled both the Eighth and Fifteenth air forces, but not the US Ninth Air Force tactical air command based in Great Britain. The AAF history stated: “On paper this arrangement promised many opportunities for disagreement, but actually there was no trouble ... (as) Eaker and Spaatz ... (agreed upon) the overriding priority that should be given to strategic bombing.”

Spaatz had administrative control of all AAF personnel in Great Britain, both the Eighth and Ninth, but not over the Fifteenth (that belonged to Eaker). Gen Knerr headed English air logistics for the massive force. Spaatz raised logistics to be equal to operations since airpower required professional support.

7. Doolittle and the Eighth Air Force. Doolittle reshaped the Eighth. Doolittle was “one of the most extraordinary air officers ever produced by the United States or any other country.” He had a master’s degree and doctorate in aeronautical engineering from M.I.T. – the first such degrees ever awarded. He had scientific curiosity and mental discipline. Brilliant and the Medal of Honor for his Tokyo raid all

combined! **263** A short, stocky, 47-year-old son of a carpenter showing a devil-may-care image covering “a man of surprising substance.” In the 1920s and 1930s, he won international airplane speed races, including for seaplanes in 1925 and the Bendix Trophy for transcontinental speed in 1931. In 1932 he set a new speed record. He had the aura of “modern-day astronauts.”

He also showed bad judgment at times. Drunk in South America in 1926, he fell from a window to break both ankles, but finished his missions of flying air shows and stunts with casts on both legs. He dallied with “wing walking” and sat on a biplane’s wheel spreader or axle as it landed. Doolittle was neither a career officer nor a West Pointer. After 13 years in the Army, he resigned in early 1930 to join Shell Oil Company where he developed 100-octane aviation fuel -- a must for WWII engines. Recalled to duty as a major on 1 July 1940, he was an aircraft plant “troubleshooter”. In January 1942, Arnold assigned the new Lt. Col. to “Special Project No. 1”, a combined Army-Navy bombing raid on Tokyo from carriers. “Doolittle’s Tokyo Raid,” of 16 B-25s from the USS Hornet on 18 April 1942, catapulted Doolittle into national prominence. The courage of the effort has been noted here. **264** Awards, recognition, and honors for Doolittle followed. His exploit helped offset the surrender of the Philippines to Japan. On 19 May FDR presented him a Medal of Honor. A bit complex with many excellent parts, he gained the trust of Spaatz and Eisenhower, which gave him command of the Eighth.

D. January 1-15, 1944: Eighth AF Bombing Logs Excel Format, Buresh xyza

Air attacks were made 8 out of 15 days. Two major strikes were on Kiel (submarines), Bordeaux and Tours, France not near frontlines free, but five were major (mostly aircraft) strikes on Munster, Bordeaux, Ludwigshafen, Oschersleben, Halberstadt and Brunswick and most for air superiority. Bombers had about eighty men killed, fighters none. There were just four bombing strikes with more than two hundred bombers – a very small effort compared to larger raids soon to come.

Medal of Honor Fighter Pilot

James Howell Howard (April 8, 1913 – March 18, 1995) was a general in the United States (Army) Air Force and the only fighter pilot in the European Theater of Operations in WWII to receive the Medal of Honor — the United States military's highest decoration. Howard was an ace in two operational theaters... with six kills with the Flying Tigers of the American Volunteer Group (AVG) in the Pacific and six kills over Europe with the USAF (“AAF”, *actually*). CBS Andy Rooney, then a wartime reporter for *Stars and Stripes*, called Howard's exploits "the greatest fighter pilot story of World War II".

In later life, Howard was a successful businessman, author, and airport director (*Wikipedia*).

Clearwater-St. Pete Airport



6 and 6 Marks



Herein lays the majesty of the effort. Shortly, these flights and fights will seem so small as to be unbelievable. But, at the time getting two hundred bombers into the air from separate bases all to rendezvous to fly over the Reich's in tight formations and meet fighter escorts on the way – were all major, “never-been-done-before” accomplishments. We can later recall these early efforts, as the men did then, with a sense of wonderment. The first 15 days of January had just four major bombing raids over 200 bombers each! This is the touchstone to watch. The exclamation mark has a twofold emphasis: 1) there were only four major raids over two weeks; 2) none are above 371 bombers; and 3) there are no B-24 or P-51 flights. In fact, there were only about 40 P-51s flying at the time. Major Howard (eventually General Howard) won the only fighter plane Medal of Honor in Europe.

1. Air Battles Diary 16 to 31 January .

21 Jan: Eighth AF —Gen Doolittle orders fighters to chase Luftwaffe planes; not ride herd around the bombers. This “wrecks the Luftwaffe’s anti-bomber tactics ... (for) a battle of attrition between **260** the German day fighter force and the more numerous long-range fighter escorts of the Eighth Air Force.”

22 Jan: Allies invade Anzio area south of Rome.

25 Jan: SHAEF—Transportation Plan adopted to bomb French and Belgian rail centers for invasion.

Eighth Army AF Total Sorites in ETO 4 to 15 January 1944

| EIGHTH AIR FORCE DAILY RECORDS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--------------|--------|-------|--------|-----|-----|-----|--------|-----------------------|-----|-----|--------------|-----|-----|----------|-----|-----|--------------------|-----|-----|-----|-------------|-----|-----|-----|----------|-----|-----|----------|-----|-----|
| | | | | B-17's | | | | B-24's | | | | US Bomb Crew | | | Lutwaffe | | | P-38 & P-47 Escort | | | | P-51 Escort | | | | Lutwaffe | | | US Crews | | |
| No. | Mission | Area | Type | Fly | Dwn | Fin | Rep | Fly | Dwn | Fin | Rep | KIA | WIA | MIA | Lost | Rep | 50% | Fly | Dwn | Fin | Rep | Fly | Dwn | Fin | Rep | Lost | Dam | 50% | KIA | WIA | MIA |
| Tue, 4 JAN 1944 | | >200 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 174.1 | Kiel | Germ | Navy | 371 | 11 | 2 | 111 | 115 | 6 | 3 | 16 | 22 | 53 | 170 | 4 | 12 | 4 | 70 | 1 | 1 | | 42 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 4 | | 1 | |
| 174.2 | Munster | Germ | Indus | 68 | 2 | 1 | 35 | | | | | | | 1 | 20 | | | 430 | 0 | 0 | 1 | | | | | 7 | 0 | 2 | | | |
| 175 | Various | Fran | Info | 4 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| CARPETBAGGER French Underground (FFI)begin | | | | 519 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Wed, 5 JAN 1944 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Report - German fighter forces increased strength & production. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 176.1 | Kiel | Germ | Navy | | 119 | 5 | 3 | 61 | 96 | 5 | 1 | 15 | 36 | 5 | 100 | 41 | 6 | 13 | 70 | 7 | | | 41 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 22 | 1 | 8 | 0 | 0 |
| 176.2 | Bordeaux | Fran | Air | | 112 | 11 | 2 | 49 | | | | | 11 | 21 | 110 | 50 | 10 | 9 | 76 | 0 | 1 | 1 | | | | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | |
| 176.3 | Tours | Fran | Air | | 78 | 1 | 0 | 10 | | | | | | | 10 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 149 | 0 | 1 | 1 | | | | 3 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | |
| 176.4 | | 4 Germ | Indus | | 73 | 2 | 1 | 22 | | | | | 0 | 2 | 20 | 2 | 5 | 2 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Thr, 6 JAN 1944 | | Info | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Lt. Gen Janmes Doolittle assumes command | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 177 | Various | Fran | Info | | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Fri, 7 JAN 1944 | | 502 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 178 | Ludwigs | Germ | Oil | 351 | 5 | 2 | 104 | 69 | 17 | 2 | 18 | 14 | 13 | 141 | 30 | 6 | 17 | 463 | 6 | 0 | 1 | 37 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | |
| 179 | Paris | Fran | Info | | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | | | | | | 0 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Sat, 8 JAN 1944 | | Info | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 180 | Antwerp | Belg | Info | | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Mon, 10 JAN 1944 | | Info | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 181 | Orleans | Fran | Info | | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Tue, 11 JAN 1944 | | 663 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 182.1 | Oschersleben | Germ | Air | | 159 | 34 | 2 | 83 | | | | | 9 | 11 | 349 | 174 | 32 | 43 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 182.2 | Halberstadt | Germ | Air | | 107 | 8 | 1 | 42 | Maj. Howard Med Honor | | | | 1 | 18 | 81 | 35 | 11 | 19 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 182.3 | Brunswick | Germ | Air | 219 | 16 | 1 | 47 | 66 | 2 | 1 | 7 | 0 | 5 | 176 | 19 | 17 | 16 | 322 | 2 | 0 | 1 | | | | | 2 | 1 | 2 | | | |
| Fri, 14 JAN 1944 | | 552 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 183 | Pas Calais | Fran | V-1 | 356 | 2 | 0 | 66 | 175 | 1 | 1 | 9 | 1 | 11 | 31 | 8 | 0 | 1 | 504 | 1 | 1 | 9 | 43 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 14 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 3 | |
| 184 | Amiens | Fran | Info | | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 185 | Wesel | Germ | Oboe | | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

2. Doolittle and the Eighth Air Force . In January 1944, both Spaatz and Doolittle saw destruction of the Luftwaffe as a prerequisite to success. Gen Kepner, the head of VIII Fighter Command, said: “the minute Spaatz and Doolittle came here they **265 266** directed that I take such steps as I felt necessary to

lick this German Air Force ... (even if) it meant ... thinning down the escort ...” On 21 January Doolittle announced the new theme where fighters attacked the *Luftwaffe* vs. “guarding” the bombers. A year in North Africa, Spaatz had codified that fighters: “Do not give close support to Heavy Bombers.” Until then, fighter losses were heavy since they were “glued” to the proximity of bombers. “Official doctrine” saw fighters as “defensive” to “drive off” German attackers, not “kill them”. In fairness, Spaatz, Doolittle and Kepner had the large escort strength that their predecessors lacked. Now, pursuit was “from the tops of the clouds to the tops of the trees.” To the negative, bombers became “the bait on the hook” to lure in the *Luftwaffe*.

3. Ultimate Pursuit Doctrine. In January came the doctrine of “ultimate pursuit” chasing the enemy until destroyed. By late February escorts flew 25 to 30 miles wide, ahead of bombers. If no enemy aircraft showed, two-thirds of the fighters went searching for them with combat at all altitudes. Then US fighters returned at a low level shooting up ground targets. The effect of the new brutal strategy was confirmed by ULTRA-intercepts. Late 1943 messages revealed the *Luftwaffe* lacked experienced fighter pilots. They reduced recon and weather flights, **267** and convalescent times for pilots. They kept experienced pilots fighting, not as trainers -- a double U.S. benefit. Spaatz – Doolittle found the weakest link — lack of experienced German pilots – for a “strategy of annihilation, not merely aerial domination.” They would kill German daylight fighter forces. By early 1944, each *Luftwaffe* group had just one or two pilots with 60 to 80 kills. After these “nothing would remain but the easy meat ... Brutal, undoubtedly, but effective—pitilessly so.” *Luftwaffe* general Adolph Galland wrote: “Wherever our **268** fighters appeared, the Americans hurled themselves at ... our airfields ... we had to skulk on our own bases. During take-off, assembling, climb ... (the) way back, during landing, and even after ... (they) attacked with overwhelming superiority.”

January 1944 saw the fundamental change with nine major raids -- two for Noball (V-1) targets in France, and seven in Germany. The *Luftwaffe* did not defend V-sites, but “frittered away men and aircraft” in winter when “wastage rates” (day-to-day attrition) saw the perils of harsh weather increase other losses. Two January raids before Doolittle hit Kiel shipyards using the timid 1943 patterns of hitting targets “on the fringe of the German heartland”. The day after Doolittle came, the Eighth had its first deep German penetration since second Schweinfurt. Of 502 planes, 417 bombed Ludwigshafen with H2X -- **269** no *Luftwaffe*! Four days later hit north central Oschersleben and Halberstadt aircraft plants. German ground-to-air controllers focused upon 1st Bombardment Division downing a huge 42 of 266 B-17s and the other one lost 16 of 47 planes -- a massive, unsustainable loss of 60 bombers or 11%! But the Eighth message was: “US fighter-escorts were becoming a formidable foe” killing 40 enemy; Col James H. Howard, won the Medal of Honor in providing the sole protection for a B-17 wing.

On 29 January 863 bombers hit Frankfurt with 1,866 tons (one-third incendiaries) to lose 34 bombers (4%); but with 47 GAF kills. Brunswick and Hannover had 742 sorties with 20 (3%) lost and **270** 45 GAF downed. *Luftwaffe* adjustments reduced their December losses, but it was temporary when 180 GAF fighters were lost *circa* 29 -30 January as new P-51 Mustangs and P-38 Lightning’s joined the effort.

In Italy, Fifteenth AF had eight heavy bomber groups, but Allied ground attacks consumed big bomber efforts. Anzio on 22 January 1944 (SHINGLE) saw Fifteenth AAF planes on German airfields, rail yards and bridges when Ultra revealed a large, planned German counterattack. The *Luftwaffe* arrived with planes from Greece. The Fifteenth flew just two “strategic” missions: 1) on 3 January, 53 B-17s hit an

Italian ball bearing plant; and 2) on 10 January, 142 B-17s struck Sofia, Bulgaria forcing a mass government and population exodus that led to Bulgaria seeking a peace. **271 272 273**

F. Eighth AF Bombing Logs Excel Format, Buresh (Jan 16-31, 1944) xyza

There were just four large raid bomber days on 21 and 24, 29 and 30 January from 317 sorties each effort to a massive 857 B-24's sent on 24 Jan 44. One notes the majority were leaflet drops, with three V-1 launch site attacks.

The end of each month, the author's Excel spreadsheets shows the total for the month and YTD for each column. As will be seen, January was a terribly slow month – still five months before D-Day Normandy. Of the big bomber sorties for the month, the B-17s far exceeded the B-24s which were just coming up to speed. However, we should note the big bombers flew just 4,800 sorties the entire month. Yet, 180 big bombers were lost. There were 127 killed and 1808 bomber crew members missing. A large figure, but it equals 180 with 10 men crews each that were lost. The fighters flew 4,800 missions that month losing just 30, whereas the Luftwaffe lost 700 fighter planes with another 400 damaged.

These figures increase each month. Plus, they do not include the RAF, fighters-bombers from the Ninth Tactical AAF or Mediterranean bombers and fighters that will join this might air war in August 1944.

Tracking totals of planes and flights over 1944 gives one a much better perception of the magnitude of the effort, and kts its costs. To the author's knowledge no one before has quantified and presented the

| EIGHTH AIR FORCE DAILY RECORDS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|-----------------|------|---------|-----------------|--------|-----|-----|--------|---------------------|-----|-----|--------------|-----|------|----------|-----|-----|--------------------|-----|-----|-----|-------------|-----|-----|-----|----------|-----|------|----------|-----|-----|---|
| No. | Mission | Area | Type | Fly | B-17's | | | B-24's | | | | US Bomb Crew | | | Lutwaffe | | | P-38 & P-47 Escort | | | | P-51 Escort | | | | Lutwaffe | | | US Crews | | | |
| | | | | | Dwn | Fin | Rep | Fly | Dwn | Fin | Rep | KIA | WIA | MIA | Lost | Rep | 50% | Fly | Dwn | Fin | Rep | Fly | Dwn | Fin | Rep | Lost | Dam | 50% | KIA | WIA | MIA | |
| Sun, 16 JAN 1944 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| General Dwight D Eisenhower assumes duties of Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force (AEF). | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Thr, 20 JAN 1944 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | Info | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 186 Brest | Fran | Info | | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Fri, 21 JAN 1944 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 187 Pas Calais | Fran | V-1 | 317 | 1 | 0 | 109 | 77 | 5 | 3 | 41 | 2 | 31 | 74 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 531 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | 48 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 2 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| | 188 Reims | Fran | Info | | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Sun, 23 JAN 1944 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 232 Le Mans | Fran | Info | | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Mon, 24 JAN 1944 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 191 Eschweiler | Germ | Electri | 58 | 2 | 2 | 5 | 857 | Sent out - recalled | | | | 5 | 0 | 21 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 535 | 3 | 0 | 6 | 42 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 19 | 4 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 9 |
| Decision made to use P-51 for escorts | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Thr, 27 JAN 1944 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 194 Paris | Fran | Info | | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Fri, 28 JAN 1944 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 195 Bonnieres | Fran | V-1 | | | | | 54 | 0 | 0 | 1 | | | | | | | | 122 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | | | | | | |
| Begin using Gee-H PFF aircraft but 200 mile max range | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 196 Amiens | Fran | Info | | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 197 Emmerich | Germ | Oboe | | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Sat, 29 JAN 1944 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 198 Frankfurt | Germ | Indus | 636 | 24 | 2 | 116 | 170 | 5 | 3 | 19 | 22 | 32 | 299 | 75 | 27 | 48 | 503 | 10 | 0 | 1 | 40 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 47 | 6 | 14 | | | 14 | |
| | 199 Lille | Fran | Info | | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Sun, 30 JAN 1944 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 200 Brunswick | Germ | Air | 599 | 18 | 3 | 104 | 143 | 2 | 0 | 11 | 4 | 14 | 206 | 51 | 7 | 27 | 445 | 2 | Est | 3 | 31 | Est | 0 | 2 | 45 | 15 | 31 | | 1 | 4 | |
| | 201 Chateauroux | Fran | Info | | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 202 Duren | Germ | Oboe | | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Mon, 31 JAN 1944 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 203 St Pol | Fran | V-1 | | | | | 74 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | 114 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 204 Glize | N'nd | Air | Bombing Mission | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 157 | 0 | 0 | 2 | | | | | 13 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 6 |
| Mnth Ttl Sort's | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | 3,689 | 142 | 22 | 964 | 1,039 | 43 | 16 | 137 | 127 | 217 | 1808 | 497 | 134 | 205 | 4,491 | 33 | 5 | 27 | 324 | 4 | 0 | 3 | 190 | 32 | 80.5 | 0 | 6 | 55 | |
| Mnth Ttl Sort's All | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | 4,728 | | | | | | | | | | | 687 | | | 4,815 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| YTD TOTAL SORTIES | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | 8,417 | | | | | | | | | | | 830 | | 143 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| YTD TOTAL B-17 & -24/FIGHTER SORTIES | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | 12,908 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| YTD LOSSES B-17 & -24/FIGHTERS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | 4% | | | | 4% | | | | | | | | | | 1% | | | 1% | | | | | | | | | | |
| YTD % SORTIES FOR EACH | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | 78% | | | | 22% | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

data to see the grand scale; “the forests, as it were, from the trees.” So, too, presenting the ETO every two weeks, now magnified by the air data and information, all coordinated in one location is a “complete” military history – and “official”.

From January 16 to 31, 1944, there were only three big B-17 bomber strikes, but they were much larger than the first two weeks of January with 313 up to 636 bombers on one target. One can only imagine the Frankfurters’ reaction when 636 B-17’s let loose their bombs on the selected targets or 599 B-17’s on Brunswick. Minutes, then 15 minutes then longer as waves after waves of B-17’s passed overhead – six hundred droning, dropping bombs. Constant explosions for perhaps 30 minutes as 500 lbs. behemoths screamed down. And it was just the beginning! Further, three raids had decent contingents of arriving in theater B-24’s who added 77 to 170 bombers to the above B-17 strikes. In fact, year-to-date, which was just January 1944, the U.S. flew 12,908 four engine bomber missions, but eleven dropped warning leaflets in Belgium and France! There were also many on German airfields. Gray-shaded areas show that all totaled, there were 8,400 bomber and 4,800 fighter sorties in January with 78% of bomber strikes by the B-17 bombers and the P-38 and P-47 fighters, as the P-51 was just breaking in with on 324 sorties in January.

Light blue shades show that bomber crews had 127 men killed and 217 wounded, but a gigantic 1,808 missing in action. No fighter pilots were killed with 55 were wounded, which means they were able to fly their planes back and land them! But the records show the *Luftwaffe* lost 1,020 fighter planes – an amazing figure, since U.S. fighter pilots were ranging around 1% casualties. Assuming the estimates are valid, and they had to be confirmed by another plane observing or with the gun cameras, then using adjusted figures, but consistently, the *Luftwaffe* lost a staggering 687 pilots in one month. Further, of all the GAF (“German Air Force”) planes damaged in air battles, 50% were counted as “shoot downs” with a plane and pilot lost. Since every bomber meant ten men killed or captured, vs. just one for the *Luftwaffe*, the losses the trained pilot losses the German will suffer compared to U.S. losses are staggering.

While the U.S. was losing a large number of bombers, every plane lost averaged two pilots per plane reduced by the fact fighter planes lost took one pilot. The point is: U.S. Bombers in January had 127 men (bomber and fighter) killed, 223 total wounded and 1,863 air crewmen missing. In terms of air war statistics, these men were absent and unavailable – the cause was not pertinent to operations. On the compassionate side, one wants to know how many were killed and how many survived in a German POW camp. In addition, a large number of bombers decided to make emergency landings in Switzerland and Sweden where they became POWs of a neutral country, one of whom, Switzerland, allegedly brutalized the U.S. prisoners who were classified as “internees”! When viewing the “pink” shaded numbers, a significant amount will be men interned in Sweden or Switzerland, not in Germany. However, POW camps were all unpleasant.

G. Chapter 18: Concentration for the Big Blow, Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare Vol II* xyza Jan 16-31 xyza

By early 1944 the main strategy was fixed. OVERLORD would be the greatest amphibious operation in history. Germany was far from defeated. In Italy German forces stopped the Allied advance. Losses in the Soviet front, Italy, and Balkans drew off the best German divisions. "I can no longer justify the

further weakening of the West in favor of other theaters of war," Hitler announced on 1 November, but the drain continued and by spring the Germans had replaced their withdrawals to the East and Field Marshal Rommel took command of Atlantic defenses. The Germans knew of OVERLORD and strove to complete the Atlantic Wall. **402** Many critical problems awaited.

1. Preparations for OVERLORD: Gen Eisenhower Takes Command. Eisenhower converted COSSAC into the "Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force" (SHAEF). His chief subordinates were:

- a. Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, his deputy;
- b. Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley, commander of the First U.S. Army;
- c. Gen Sir Bernard L. Montgomery, commander 21 Army Group in charge of the assault phase;
- d. Lt. Gen. Carl Spaatz, commander of U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe;
- e. Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay, Allied Naval Commander in Chief;
- f. Air Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, Air Commander in Chief; and
- g. Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, Chief of Staff.

Eisenhower wrote Marshall: **403** "The most important of all these questions is that of increasing the strength of the initial assault wave in OVERLORD." All planning was done in Europe as Marshall and OPD planners held "second chair" to assist and to give counsel and suggestions, Eisenhower-made the final decisions. Yet, Marshall did **404** send officers with a plan to occupy Paris with paratroops landing 150 miles away. **405** It flopped. But Marshall sought to bolster Ike's position especially vis-à-vis his superiors in London. He did offer Eisenhower his choice of commanders and staff. Above all, Marshall was a problem sniffer and solver -- OVERLORD must not fail.

2. Windup of BOLERO. By 1944 many former problems vanished replaced by staffs who had over a year become knowledgeable. **406** The build-up pace greatly accelerated. Combat forces began arriving late 1943 and hit 50% in January. All were due before D-day. Combat air groups and total Army personnel doubled to 1.5 million. The "Queens" ferried two divisions each month. Those from the Mediterranean were battle hardened. SEXTANT plans were 1,476,300 men by 31 May 1944 – the theater added 50,000 more. **407** In five months 5 million tons of cargo was offloaded. The crisis erupted when all the inbound passengers and freight collided with all of the outbound passengers and freight. The British agreement to delay some of their imports. "By 31 May there were still certain shortages in service troops, the shipment of some combat units had been deferred, and the problem of replacements had not yet been solved."

H. Chapter 15: Army Manpower and End of the ASTP College Program for Sergeants; The 90-Division Gamble, Command Decisions by Maurice Matloff Jan 1944 xyza

1. Questionable Assumptions and Suppositions on WWII Manpower Plans. The boldest of all calculated risks Gen Marshall took in WWII was halting U.S. Army ground combat strength at ninety divisions. "Students of warfare will long debate whether the decision was as wise as it was courageous, as foresighted as it was successful." It was of necessity, dictated by national policies on Allied strategy, air power, technology, balancing a war economy and a period of study. **366**

Both the country and military were “confident of resources to meet war needs as in late 1941 and in 1942. The “cutting edge” in divisions needed to win per the Victory Program of the fall of 1941 was a monumental 213 divisions premised on a European War and Soviet collapse so the “United States and Great Britain might have to defeat the huge armies of Germany unaided.”⁶ Throughout most of 1942 the War Department assumed it would ultimately be necessary to support at least two hundred divisions, but this also required a “heavy-fisted air arm” whose “blueprint embodied in the 273-air-group program approved in September 1942, was to remain the Army Air Forces guide in World War II.” Yet, Army officials consistently calculated into late 1942 that only 10,500,000 men could be inducted without disrupting the U.S. economy.

(Comment: The author did not locate a late 1942 analysis for 1943 workforce manufacturing and draft requirements. It may exist, but it seems a “landmark study” would have been published right after WWII. It’s the type of information about which a victorious nation would chortle.)

The North Africa invasion of November 1942 scuttled an England build-up and 1943 arrived with U.S. troops going to the Pacific and Africa, but not Europe. **367** There were 25,000,000 Americans fit for service with the ceiling of 15 to 16 million for active-duty service. Germany had 9,835,000 (10.9% of its population) and Britain 3,885,000 (8.2%), but U.S. officials insisted on 10,500,000 men for the U.S. (7.8%) to avoid a “serious dislocation to the American economy?” Matloff opined the “single greatest tangible asset (of) the United States ... was the productive capacity of its industry ... American manpower calculations were closely correlated with the needs of war industry.”

(Comment: It was a statement of the obvious. The first question was: How large must U.S. forces be to insure victory over Japan and Germany? The second question was: How much larger must they be if the U.S.S.R. is defeated as then feared?) Matloff’s analysis (and others) fails to state the facts which were not until the **Soviets won the crushing Battle of Kursk, 5 July to 23 August 1943, did Western Allies believe the Soviets might survive or be victorious.** The first question was answered with Wedemeyer’s August 1941 Victory Plan and ignored. Under Matloff’s analysis it was mid-1943 before the U.S. knew the total U.S. labor needs. If one looks for a rationale and process, the answer seems to be the U.S. postponed manpower issues to mid-1943 and then “gambled” on 90 divisions for mid-1944.)

Matloff justifies the initial 7.8% manning ceiling upon: 1) the Army and Navy were competing with industry; 2) mobilizing too many would slow war production; 3) large numbers were “in transit”; 4) the war on the Russian front was an unknown; 5) strategic bombing impacts were not clear; **368** 5) a postponed cross-Channel attack until 1944 slowed ground army mobilizing; and 6) a large air force first took precedence the ground army. Hence, “mobilization of much more than a hundred divisions by the end of 1943 appeared to be premature.” Thus, the January 1943 had 100 divisions by December 1943 and an Army of 8,208,000 -- a figure FDR already approved. **“At last, these estimates were approaching the ultimate ceiling strengths of the Army.”** *(Comment: The basis for such conclusions is not known).* The following appears closer to truth:

⁶ This was a rather bold statement in the “Cold War” era where fear of a Soviet attack was constant.

Efforts ... pointed to (a) drastic reductions of earlier estimates ... **369** (that assumed) the USSR might be defeated ... forcing on the Allies a ... more costly ground effort ... (Plus,) planners had had to take ... (the Combined Bomber Offensive) failure into consideration. Viewing both ... pessimistically ... planners ... (gave) high estimates envisaging a very large ground force ... it would be far easier to decrease an ... Army ... it was small wonder that the planners were overshooting the mark. (Regardless, as stated here, it was a major error).

The JCS gave the issue to the Joint (Senior Officers') Strategic Survey Committee who concluded shipping limited U.S. forces. It was true until January 1945 when all divisions deployed; more were needed, but there were none. Planners required a theoretical justification for a theoretical calculation to answer the unanswerable: "When is enough, enough?" "Enough" was equaled the number on hand – no surprise! FDR approved 8,208,000 for 1943 and **370** in January the Gen Gasser Board recommended reducing stateside forces. February 1943 Marshall approved 7.5 million enlisted for or enough for 120-125 divisions. **It was a shocker!** Planners used a "division slice" of 60,000 enlisted per division. In truth, the ratio of combat forces to non-combat was much lower, so there were 80,000 enlisted men per division fielded, not 60,000 per division, but the division itself only had 20,000 men! The figure 60,000 noncombat soldiers for every 20,000 combat men includes the air forces but deducting the air forces from ground combat still meant there were 40,000 supporting men for every 20,000 in a division which itself was 50% supporting personnel.

Comment: First, there were 90 divisions. Using the given ration, equates to 80,000 enlisted men per division and here is the conundrum, since there were under 20,000 men in each division total!

| Units and Centers | Mobilized as of 31 Dec 42 | | 1943 Augmentation | | Total by 31 Dec 43 | |
|-------------------|---------------------------|---------|-------------------|---------|--------------------|-----------|
| | White | Negro | White | Negro | White | Negro |
| Total | 4,532,117 | 467,883 | 2,246,233 | 286,767 | 6,778,350 | 754,650 |
| Combat Units | 1,820,254 | 86,294 | 842,911 | 64,873 | 2,663,165 | 151,167 |
| Service Units a | 578,262 | 148,370 | 263,300 | 90,991 | 841,562 | 239,361 |
| AAF and services | 1,190,363 | 109,637 | 810,000 | 90,000 | 2,000,363 | 199,637 |
| Overhead b | 363,820 | 65,880 | 64,155 | 9,145 | 427,975 | 75,025 |
| RTC's | 238,500 | 27,500 | 44,000 | 6,000 | 282,500 | 33,500 |
| OCS's | 72,200 | 800 | 0 | 0 | 72,200 | 800 |
| Unassigned | 268,718 | 29,402 | 221,867 | 25,758 | 490,585 | 55,160 |
| | 9,064,234 | 935,766 | 4,492,466 | 573,534 | 13,556,700 | 1,509,300 |
| | 10,000,000 | | 5,066,000 | | 15,066,000 | |

Thus, in February 1943, Marshall pushed for 7,500,000 enlisted and 120-125 divisions by D-Day June 1944 for a force 8,208,000. It was a minimum force intended "to take advantage of any favorable

opportunities" (*i.e.*, a German weakening due to the Soviets). The Navy objected, so in February 1943 six Congressional manpower investigations were ongoing. Congress, after a lot of "speechifying" was not going to "risk their political necks by taking a position where they might be charged with sabotaging the war effort. They will talk, but they won't act."

The Army formed the Col. Bessell Jr. committee to recommend staffing changes or, more directly, **371** the efficacy of training uneducated African French forces, or as the author admits: "This was a rephrasing of the thorny problem-how far to go in aiding Allies-which the Army planners had faced from the very beginning and were to continue to face." Bessell concluded little was gained by increasing foreign aid funds to arm other nations and would not greatly alter the "total amount of effective manpower that could be placed in combat, nor ... (do so) more quickly than ... (the current) program..." Late April 1943 the committee reduced the Army from 185 to 155 divisions with "8,200,000-man ceiling ... imposed by manpower limitations." The histories offer platitudes that fail to explain what happened. **372**

In April (1944) the ... War Manpower Commission ... (told the military) approximately 1,500,000 men could be furnished ... 1944 ... close to the limit of ... the manpower pool ... (The) War Manpower Commission estimated 11,300,000 men, and the Joint Staff Planners 10,900,000, as the number that could be kept in uniform indefinitely ... (and Joint Staff Planners agreed to stay within) the approved 1943 Army Troop Basis goals-8,200,000 total strength and 100 divisions ...

2. The Little-Known Maddox Committee 90-Division Gamble. Earlier in mid-1943, Marshall appointed the (Col) Maddocks Committee to reduce divisions after Soviets were able **373** "... to check the German advance ...(plus the) the prospect of gaining air superiority ...(that) made obsolete the initial Victory Program estimates of 1941." They found:

- 1) Reduce 1943 Army strength from 8,248,000 to 7,657,000,
- 2) Build a force of 88 divisions (meaning only 12 new 1943 divisions) and
- 3) Set the ultimate **Army air-ground size in late 1943 based upon the Soviet and air wars.**

Here the committee found only 100 divisions were needed to defeat Germany along with 30 - 40 divisions against Japan (divisions transferred from Europe). If the CBO was fully effective, the total force for the ETO might be 60-70 divisions, with 30 to 40 divisions for Japan, but ETO divisions could be shipped to the PTO. Mid-June 1943 Gen Marshall and Sec Stimson deferred activating 12 divisions.

On 1 July 1943 the 1944 proposed troop basis was for 88 divisions and 7,700,000 men. Two light provisional divisions were added for 90 divisions. **374** FDR approved the cut to 7,700,000 men as "the 90-division limit as the 'cutting edge' necessary to win the war." No one knew if true; it was a great saying. Shipping pushed airborne and infantry divisions; armor was cut. **The end December 1943 mix: - 67 infantry, 2 cavalry, 16 armored, and 5 airborne (90 total)** only added 16 new divisions in 1943 vs 38 in 1942. Then the 1943 deployment slowed from to thirteen, not seventeen, divisions overseas. Late 1943 saw new demands for B-29 crews – it killed ideas of 15 more 1944 divisions. **375** The Army

stopped August 1943 with the 90th division activated, but the worry remained until war's end. **376** Marshall felt Army was 370,000 men short. He took drastic action cutting the Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP) "to educate some of its more intelligent men in colleges" on 10 February to just 30,000 men to add 120,000 to ground and service forces. FDR halted War Manpower and Selective Service deferments. By Spring 1944 the induction backlog was gone.

I. Chapter 1: Strategic Background of OVERLORD; Part I: Policy and Strategy WW II Early 1943: U.S. Naval Administration in WWII, Naval Forces Europe, Histories. Vol V Operation NEPTUNE (1946) xyza Jan 1944

(Comment: This is a Naval history introduction condensed with edits not noted but to portray the original approach. The "stilted" writing style is reminiscent of the times. It is paraphrased. Its value is its naval orientation)

Part 1 INTRODUCTORY: POLICY AND STRATEGY IN WORLD WAR II EARLY 1943

1. Definition of Operation OVERLORD. Operation OVERLORD was the planning, preparation and execution of the 1944 invasion of Europe via Northwestern France and military advance into Germany and destruction of its armed forces. Operation NEPTUNE was the cross-channel assault phase Planning phases began in January 1943 when CCS established COSSAC and in August 1943 when the CCS approved the COSSAC outline plan. The operation began May 31, 1944, when the first ships sailed. Landing commenced at 0630 on June 6, 1944, and continued until the German forces surrendered on 8 May 1945. OVERLORD terminated on July 14, 1945, when the Allied Supreme Command was dissolved.

Definition of Operation NEPTUNE. Operation NEPTUNE were the activities for a cross-channel amphibious assault on the continent of Europe to secure a "lodgement" for further offensive operations.

2. Brief Summary of U.S. Policy and Grand Strategy before WWII. Grand strategy is the plan for employment of the nation's military to accomplish the objects for which the nation undertook war. Monroe Doctrine policy resisted European or Asiatic power in the Western Hemisphere. British Royal Navy Sea power had made it unnecessary to plan overseas military action. In the last 50 years power relationships saw profound changes, as Mahan pointed out in "The Influence of Sea Power on History" (1891-1896). British naval superiority existed only in the North Sea and North Atlantic. The U.S. had to develop new naval and American policy. The growth of Germany and of Japan created a new world situation. Twice **2** the U.S. engaged in World Wars per 1890 concepts when the U.S. became a world power.

3. ARCADIA Conference Strategy – (Washington DC, January 1942). The rise of Axis governments made clear by January 1938 "the United States would not long be able alone to defend the Western Hemisphere should the other continents fall under Axis domination." President Roosevelt emphasized the danger when he called for a "quarantine". When World War II U.S. interests required Germany's defeat and after the June 1940 French defeat American opinion declared defense of America required Allied aid. Pearl Harbor made the U.S. "a full partner. **3**

The security of the Western Hemisphere was menaced. U.S. policy was to defeat Germany and keep Japan from attacking the Dutch per ABC-1 and at ARCADIA. The strategic plan was: (1) The victory armament program requires secure war industry and sea communications; (2) the Atlantic and European were decisive theaters; (3) Maintenance of a Pacific position; (4) The attack on Germany should start with a Mediterranean offensive, bombing of Germany and a blockade of Germany and by subversive operations in Europe. 4-5 (Note: *Either point 4 was omitted in the other "histories" or it was an embellishment here*).

Russia and British Empire war potential was completely committed. At the ARCADIA conference (24 December to 14 January 1942), American and British Chiefs and President and Prime Minister created three strategic policies; (1) The victory program for security of war industry; (2) the Atlantic and Europe as decisive theaters; (3) Maintain a Pacific defense; (4) The attack on Germany would start with offensive operations in the Mediterranean and bombing of Fortress Europe, with blockade and subversive operations. 5 Post-Mediterranean was open. In 1943, it may be possible to return across the Mediterranean for a final assault on Germany. ARCADIA strategy gave defense in the Pacific a higher priority than offense in Europe but gave European offensives a higher priority on an offensive in the Pacific. The question really was, how should the forces of the United States be deployed? *(A unique twist of logic)*

The 1942 situation was deplorable. The Pacific Fleet was crippled. The Japanese had the South China Seas. By June 12, Japan it had Singapore, Sumatra, Java, New Guinea, Philippines, Mandalay, Kiska and Attu Alaska and Rommel's offensive 6 stood near Alexandria on 1 July 1942. The Germans almost captured Moscow and Leningrad and in June 1942 penetrated to the Caucasus and Volga River capturing much of Stalingrad. China was more desperate. The enemy had the initiative and could concentrate. Japan gained her economic self-sufficiency.

The United Nations were seriously reduced. The Japanese had superior strength and interior lines. They could: (1) capture of Burma and India denying access to China; (2) seize Ceylon and Bay of Bengal after sea communications, (3) attack Australia and Hawaii; and (4) attack Russian Siberia to support the German drive to the Caucasus. 7 United Nations sea power in the Atlantic equaled the Axis and Vichy. The former had two hundred more destroyers, the latter 200 more submarines. Allied navies had to protect shipping and were numerically inferior to Japan.

The Germans could: (1) destroy the Russian Army to gain Caucasus oil; (2) capture the Middle East to blocking Russian aid and destroy Middle East forces; (3) invade Britain; (4) bases in Spain, Central and Western Mediterranean and North Africa controlling Mediterranean shipping and Middle East; (5) and contest Atlantic Sea lanes. Operations in Britain, West Mediterranean, North Africa, and the Iberian Peninsula saw Germans to divert too many forces from Russia so other options were improbable. Probable Russia operations were Caucasus oil with: (1) an attack towards Moscow; (2) an amphibious attack on the Caucasus; (3) and offensive from Libya through Turkey for a double envelopment. 8

The JCS noted, "the United Nations would constantly be on the verge of ultimate defeat ...(in) 1942." Four factors were: (1) importance of Russia; (2) small U.S resources; (3) limited U.S. shipping and (4) if Russia did not collapse, the U.S. would deploy decisive military forces. Four U.S. courses were: (1) war in

both theaters; (2) to concentrate on Japan first (3) concentrate on Europe and abandon the West Pacific; (4) concentrate on Europe and defend southwest Pacific. ARCADIA decided to concentrate on Germany, hold Japan with minimum forces; defend (1) North and South America; (2) Trans-Atlantic routes; (3) Australia and Hawaii; (4) the Japanese and destroy its merchant fleet; (5) limited air defense 9 in India-Burma-China; and (6) exert with the British maximum offensive operations against Germany.

PART 2. COMBINED STRATEGY IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER (U.S. Navy: THE STRATEGIC BACKGROUND OF OVERLORD)

4. Combined Planning of Future Operations; The Situation (January-July 1942). The CCS defined strategic concepts and a strategy at ARCADIA of “wearing down Germany's resistance”. It was not aggressive, so preventing “the elimination of Russia” was vital and no Continental action was possible in 1942 with a possible “sacrifice invasion in 1943”. Yet, 10 most desirable was to invade Europe in 1942 provided resources were available which were obviously not available. British Chiefs sought 1) to divert Axis air and ground forces from Russia; (2) strengthen positions; and (3) neutralize Vichy and Italian Navies. Americans had radically different views (1) concentrate on one offensive; (2) Russia maximum aid; (3) a French offensive to destroy Germany and (4) launch no other offensives. 11

Gen Marshall estimated a need for 48 divisions, 6,500 combat aircraft, 7,000 landing craft with Britain providing 40%. The U.S. would field 1,000,000 men, 3,650 aircraft, and half the assault craft by 1 April 1943. Shipping and landing craft were bottlenecks but meant abandoning all other plans. He saw two emergencies. (1) A major Russians success or German collapse or (2) a Russian collapse. The 12 latter meant “an Allied sacrifice offensive where forces might be annihilated but might divert enough German strength to save Russia.” Marshall's plan meant a British only sacrifice. British Chiefs objected. A British Sacrifice did not aid Russia and ruined England. The Germans with a near total victory in 13 Russia would not divert forces to France but would finish off Russia first -- then annihilate the British Army and then England itself. The U.S. plan eliminated both England and Russia! All was at the mercy of Pacific, Middle East and submarine war successes. Absent all three, nothing else was possible.

5. 1942-1943 British Strategic Concepts. Middle East and Mediterranean positions were gravely endangered. Eliminating Russia freed enormous German forces for the Middle East; the small British Army could not resist. Allied strategy had to strengthen the area by capturing North Africa and Mediterranean before Russia collapsed! (*Extreme Opportunism!*) 14 To the British possession of the Mediterranean and North Africa allowed the Allies:

1. to conduct an air bombardment of the Axis from the south;
2. to "eliminate Italy as an active partner in the Axis";
3. to bring Turkey into the war on the Allied side;
4. to launch or threaten Germany's southern and Balkan flank; and
5. to complete the blockade of Europe "closing and tightening the ring around Germany".

In the British view, Allied strategy should have been:

1. Plan a return to the Continent if situations allowed it;
2. Launch operations to afford Russia immediate assistance and accomplish other Allied aims;
3. Conduct a two-fold offensive to: a) enter North Africa and seize the Mediterranean; and b) divert German air strength from Russia with a massive air offensive; and c) a plan to draw Germans into France and **15** Norway.

| Build-up of Allied Divisions | | | | | | | |
|--|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| | 1-Jul-43 | 1-Oct-43 | 1-Jan-44 | 1-Apr-44 | 1-Jul-44 | 1-Oct-44 | 1-Jan-45 |
| Build-up (Divs) from U.S. only | | | | | | | |
| U.S. | 1 | 7 | 13 | 20 | 25 | 28 | 31 |
| British | 4 | 10 | 10 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 |
| Build-up (Divs) from U.S. and North Africa and Mediterranean | | | | | | | |
| U.S. | 1 | 6 | 8 | 10 | 18 | 24 | 27 |
| British | 0 | 11 | 14 | 24 | 25 | 25 | 25 |
| Total | 1 | 17 | 22 | 34 | 43 | 49 | 52 |
| Grand Total | 6 | 34 | 45 | 68 | 82 | 91 | 97 |
| Build-up (Divs) Total ETO | | | | | | | |
| US Total | 2 | 13 | 21 | 30 | 43 | 52 | 58 |
| British Total | 4 | 21 | 24 | 38 | 39 | 39 | 39 |
| % of Total | 6% | 35% | 46% | 70% | 85% | 94% | 100% |
| US % Total | 33% | 38% | 47% | 44% | 52% | 57% | 60% |

Several plans North Africa (GYMNAST) plans were reviewed at ARCADIA. **16** Marshall found British policy unsound:

1. North African forced dispersal of forces, not concentration;
2. A new front was an enormous drain, especially in overhead forces.;
3. North African further strained overtaxed Allied shipping;
4. Only in France permitted sufficient forces to defeat Germany; Italy, Mediterranean and Turkey were asides;
5. Select one action so production, transportation, training, and preparation focus on it.
6. A 1942 Mediterranean attack and shipping made a 1943 channel operation impossible

The decision for a 1942 North Africa vs a full-scale 1943 offensive was made the President and Prime **17** Minister who demanded 1942 action. Their CCS directive of 24 June 1942 read:

1. Plan BOLERO in 1943 on as large a scale as possible with the U.S. and Great Britain acting offensively in 1942.
2. France or the Low Countries in 1942 have greater gains, but a sensible plan seems impossible.
3. Operation GYMNAST (North Africa), will be explored and plans completed in all details as soon as possible. **18**

A minor 1942 cross-channel assault was impossible. TORCH attacked Germany by an air-Mediterranean offensive.**19**

6. OVERLORD and American Strategic Concepts. Mediterranean strategy succeeded. Cross-channel planning continued though the COSSAC, Gen Morgan's outline plans for OVERLORD by QUEBEC in August 1943. Italian surrender altered the QUEBEC Conference, but OVERLORD only had conditional approval – a final decision was postponed. **21** The gradual Allied strategy did not alter U.S. strategic ideas. Gen Marshall saw Germany as the objective which required reducing Mediterranean actions for a defeat via a bomber offensive, invasion and small Mediterranean actions. It was unsound to defeat Germany by fighting in the Mediterranean. Only in France could large armies defeat Germany. Gen Marshall opposed North African and Sicily at Casablanca. **22** At TRIDENT he agreed to Italy with limits. At Quebec he urged OVERLORD. At Cairo he sought final OVERLORD decisions. **23** At Teheran he worried OVERLORD would succeed.**24**

7. Planning Offensive Operations; 1943 British Proposals. British ideas gradually accepted defeat of Germany as the end plan. But the Commonwealth had to consolidate its Mediterranean, Near and Middle East positions. It saw British planners using U.S. forces in a 1943 effort in the East Mediterranean, not in a cross-channel attack, at Germany through the Balkans and the Black Sea. (This is a great stretch). The changing views arose at Casablanca, Washington and Quebec as the British insisted on Mediterranean battles, bombing Germany and war production plus: **25-26** 1) occupying Sicily; 2) eliminating Italy; 3) getting Turkey on the Allied side; and 4) gaining a foothold in the Balkans.

All were an anathema to the U.S. who sought "a speedy allied victory." British focus was on subsections of the final plans, such as: 1) 20 to 30 divisions of German troops to replace Italians. 2) forcing German forces to South France; 3) splitting German air defenses between England and Italy; 4) bringing Ploesti oil fields under air attacks; 5) Italian air bases for medium bombers against Germany; 6) **27** limit *Luftwaffe* efforts at the Channel Coast; 7) induce Turkey to open the Black Sea and 8) (most disturbing) an attack on the East Mediterranean. Each one frightened the Americans! *(Comment: Recall this is the U.S. Navy Logistical Command history whose bias is clear.).*